The myth of the 'boring election': populism and the 2017 German election by Neuner, Fabian G. & Wratil, Christopher
The	myth	of	the	‘boring	election’:	Populism	and	the
2017	German	election
The	German	federal	elections	scheduled	for	24	September	are	widely	expected	to
produce	another	victory	for	Angela	Merkel’s	CDU/CSU.	As	Fabian	G.	Neuner	and
Christopher	Wratil	highlight,	however,	Merkel’s	dominant	position	in	the	polling	has
potentially	masked	some	interesting	developments	during	the	campaign.	Chief	among
these	is	that	there	has	been	a	rise	in	populist	sentiment	in	Germany,	which	is	fuelling
support	for	the	right-wing	Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD)	and	damaging	the	CDU/CSU
more	than	any	other	party.
As	Germany	goes	to	the	polls	this	Sunday,	the	election	has	been	widely	decried	as	a	“boring”	contest	with	Angela
Merkel	perceived	as	virtually	certain	to	win	her	fourth	successive	chancellorship	since	2005.	What	this	popular
view	misses,	however,	is	that	despite	the	continued	dominance	of	the	CDU/CSU,	the	German	party	system	is
experiencing	a	profound	transformation.	According	to	recent	polls	and	forecasting	models,	the	populist	Alternative
for	Germany	(AfD)	is	set	to	enter	the	Bundestag	with	about	9-12%	of	the	popular	vote.	Together	with	the	Left
party	(Die	Linke)	that	established	itself	as	the	successor	of	the	Socialist	Unity	Party	after	1989,	two	populist
parties	–	one	with	a	left-wing	and	one	with	a	right-wing	ideology	–	are	slated	to	be	represented	in	the	German
parliament,	together	accounting	for	about	a	fifth	or	even	a	quarter	of	all	seats.
To	understand	this	transformation,	we	conducted	one	of	the	first	studies	of	the	influence	of	populist	attitudes	on
voting	behaviour	in	Germany	in	a	joint	project	with	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	(see	recent	report	here)	based	on	a
representative	panel	survey	of	eligible	voters	between	2015	and	2017.	In	particular,	we	aimed	to	ascertain	how
different	political	positions	and	priorities	may	have	differential	impacts	on	populist	versus	non-populist	voters.	For
this	purpose,	we	recently	fielded	a	survey	experiment,	in	which	respondents	had	to	rate	hypothetical	political
candidates	running	in	their	district	in	the	2017	election.	Candidates	randomly	varied	in	their	political	positions	on
the	refugee	crisis,	the	future	of	the	European	Union,	redistribution	(taxes),	and	trade	and	globalisation.
Candidates	also	promoted	two	out	of	thirteen	randomly	drawn	political	priorities,	ranging	from	classical	calls	to
“strengthen	social	justice”	and	“promote	economic	growth”	to	populist	priorities	such	as	“overthrowing	the	political
elite”	or	“strengthening	direct	democracy”.
The	results	in	Figure	1	present	Average	Marginal	Component	Effects	(AMCE)	for	our	two	sub-groups:	non-
populists	and	populists.	We	determine	these	groups	based	on	respondents’	answers	to	an	eight	item	populist
attitudes	battery,	which	measures	support	for	populism	as	an	ideology	pitting	the	‘corrupt	political	elite’	against
the	‘pure	people’	without	any	right-wing	or	left-wing	connotations.	For	each	attribute,	the	estimate	shows	the
change	in	probability	that	a	candidate	will	be	preferred	if	said	candidate	were	to	adopt	a	given	position	when
compared	to	the	baseline	position.
Figure	1:	Effects	of	political	positions	and	priorities	on	candidate	support
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Note:	Average	marginal	component	effects	(Hainmueller	et	al.	2014)	with	95%	confidence	intervals.
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At	first	glance,	the	figure	reveals	that	the	key	issues	affecting	vote	choice	differ	between	the	two	groups	of	voters.
Most	prominently,	the	treatment	of	refugees	is	much	more	important	for	populist	voters.	While	admitting	many
more	refugees	is	apparently	a	losing	issue	among	all	voters,	positions	in	favour	of	deporting	refugees	increase
candidate	support	by	up	to	29	percentage	points	among	populist	voters	(from	the	baseline	of	admitting	many
more	refugees).	In	contrast,	non-populist	voters	are	most	supportive	of	candidates	advocating	the	admission	or
deportation	of	only	some	refugees,	but	the	effect	of	these	positions	is	at	most	14	percentage	points.
In	contrast,	candidates’	positions	on	how	the	EU	should	be	developed	strongly	move	non-populist	but	not	populist
voters.	While	stronger	EU	cooperation	markedly	mobilises	those	who	do	not	hold	populist	attitudes,	populist
voters	are	swayed	neither	by	pro-EU	nor	anti-EU	positions.	Even	more	interestingly,	positions	on	free	trade	and
globalisation	do	not	seem	to	move	either	type	of	voters	much.
These	findings	thus	run	counter	to	widespread	arguments	that	populist	parties	and	politicians	are	able	to	mobilise
voters	with	populist	attitudes	due	to	their	anti-EU	and	anti-globalisation	rhetoric.	While	such	arguments	may	apply
in	different	contexts,	at	least	in	the	German	case,	we	find	that	globalisation	is	a	non-issue	and	EU	integration	an
issue	that	garners	support	among	mainstream	voters	but	not	populists.
In	addition	to	issue	positions,	we	also	varied	the	political	priorities	associated	with	each	candidate.	The
overarching	take-away	here	is	that	changes	in	political	priorities	had	little	influence	on	candidate	choice,
especially	when	compared	to	the	three	major	issues	discussed	above.	The	first	five	priorities	are	supposed	to
mimic	populist	talking	points	and	allow	us	to	test	whether	adopting	populist	themes	is	a	winning	strategy
compared	to	more	traditional	political	priorities.	Somewhat	surprisingly	perhaps,	there	is	only	a	small	amount	of
movement	induced	by	these	priorities.	Perhaps	the	most	interesting	exception	is	the	populist	call	to	overthrow	the
political	elite:	even	those	who	are	predisposed	toward	populist	ideas	reject	this	notion.	This	contrasts	with	populist
voters	in	countries	such	as	the	US,	where	Donald	Trump	ran	a	whole	campaign	on	“draining	the	swamp	in
Washington”	and	notions	of	“crooked	Hillary”.
Looking	beyond	our	conjoint	experiment,	we	also	examined	whether	populist	attitudes	are	correlated	with	voting
for	actual	political	parties.	Figure	2	plots	the	average	marginal	effect	of	a	one	unit	increase	on	the	populism	scale
(which	ranges	from	zero	to	eight)	on	the	probability	of	voting	for	each	of	the	major	parties	(controlling	for	gender,
age,	education,	income,	and	left-right	self-placement).
Figure	2:	Populist	attitudes	and	probability	to	vote	for	party
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Note:	Average	marginal	effects	for	one	unit	change	in	populist	attitudes	(0-8	scale).
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This	reveals	that	populist	attitudes	are	key	correlates	of	vote	choice	in	these	elections,	even	when	controlling	for
sociodemographic,	socioeconomic,	and	political	factors.	The	prime	beneficiary	of	populist	attitudes	is	the	AfD.	A
one	unit	increase	on	the	populist	attitudes	scale	is	associated	with	around	a	five	percentage	point	higher
probability	of	voting	for	the	AfD.
This	mainly	comes	at	the	expense	of	the	CDU/CSU,	which	is	highly	unpopular	among	populist	voters	and	loses
about	7	percentage	points	per	unit	increase	in	populist	attitudes.	The	effects	for	the	second	“populist”	party,	the
Left	party,	are	much	more	muted.	It	gains	about	one	percentage	point	per	unit	increase	on	the	populist	attitudes
scale,	while	the	Greens	loose	one	percentage	point.	The	SPD	and	the	FDP	are	about	equally	strong	among
populist	and	non-populist	voters,	and	therefore	the	level	of	populist	attitudes	barely	affects	their	results.
In	this	view,	the	2017	German	elections	are	anything	but	boring.	Angela	Merkel	may	just	win	her	fourth
chancellorship	in	a	row,	but	anti-establishment	and	populist	attitudes	have	been	powerfully	activated	in	this
campaign	and	they	are	not	only	reshaping	the	party	system,	but	it	is	the	CDU/CSU	that	is	most	negatively
affected	by	them.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or
the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Markus	Spiske	(CC	BY	2.0)
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